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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO: 05-4194
MICHAEL GARRETT,
Appellant
v.
JOSEPH V. SMITH, Warden
_______________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00642)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 14, 2006
Before; MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed : May 12, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Michael Garrett appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion
for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
order of the District Court.
The parties are familiar with the facts, thus we only briefly recite them here. On

April 28, 2003, a call was placed from FCI-Ft. Dix using the PIN number of inmate
Jamelle Peters. Prison officials monitored the call, believing that Garrett was
impermissibly using Peters’ PIN to make calls while he was on phone restriction. During
the conversation, the inmate placing the call mentioned that it was his birthday the
following day. It was in fact Garrett’s birthday. The caller also asked to see “Karen.”
Not only is there a Karen on Garrett’s visitor list, the person receiving the call referred to
the caller as “Rab,” Garrett’s nickname. Garrett appeared before a disciplinary hearing
officer (DHO) on charges of phone abuses and refusing to accept program assignments.
Garrett requested a staff representative and asked to call Peters as a witness. The DHO
postponed the hearing to accommodate the requests. At the subsequent hearing, Garrett
waived his right to representation and to call Peters. The DHO found that Garrett placed
the call and sanctioned him with an aggregate of 67 days disallowance of good-conduct
time, 139 days forfeiture of non-vested good-conduct time, a six-year loss of visiting and
phone privileges, and 90 days of disciplinary segregation.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Garrett brought the instant petition
alleging due process violations for the denial of his request to present Peters as a witness
and denial of access to the tape of the phone call. He also alleges that the evidence was
insufficient and that the penalty was arbitrary and capricious. The District Court rejected
the claims and denied relief. Garrett appeals pro se.1

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s legal conclusions. See Wilson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195,
197 (3d Cir. 1999).

With respect to his due process claim, a prisoner must be given the opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his own defense. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(c). Garrett argues that he was
denied access to the recording and the right to have an expert analyze the tape of the
phone conversation. While line seventeen of the incident report shows that Garrett
“would like someone to analyze my voice and his [Peters’] voice because he calls that
number frequently,” Garrett never requested a copy of the tape. However, since he did
request an evidentiary analysis, we must still determine if the denial of the request
violates due process.
Garrett cites no authority, nor have we found any, that establishes a due process
right to have the prison find, retain, and present an expert witness on the prisoner’s
behalf. Rather, the Eighth Circuit has held that such a right does not exist. See Spence v.
Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67 (stating
reasonable penological needs may limit the right to present evidence). We agree with the
Eighth Circuit, and thus, Garrett was not denied due process.
Garrett also alleges that the DHO prevented him from calling Peters as a witness
by threatening additional disciplinary sanctions if the DHO did not find Peters’ testimony
credible. We agree with the District Court that Garrett fails to present any evidence
contradicting his apparent voluntary choice to waive his right to call Peters, and his
arguments on appeal are unpersuasive.
Next Garrett claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the discipline. A
prison disciplinary decision will be upheld if there is “some evidence” to support the

finding. See Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
The record exhibits more than enough evidence to meet this relatively deferential
standard including, but not limited to, the three incriminating facts gleaned from the tape
and that Garrett was prohibited from using the phone.
Finally, Garrett claims that the sanctions were arbitrary and capricious. Although
he does not raise this issue in his informal brief, we agree with the District Court that the
sanctions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Garrett was sanctioned in accordance
with the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 541.13. The DHO noted that this was Garrett’s sixth
offense for violation of Code 297, allowing the DHO to impose any sanction authorized
for the most severe offenses. 28 C.F.R. § 514.13 Table 5. A lighter, but still severe
penalty may be imposed for a third violation of Code 307. Both penalties are clearly
explained in the DHO’s report and are consistent with the regulations. Thus, the
sanctions were not arbitrary.

